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In securities litigation, the measure of damages is, at least to
me, equally as important as the question of liability. A defen-
dant need not be concerned about liability in a civil case if he
can win on the damage issue or can reduce the damages to a
very low number. On the other hand, his position is very differ7
ent if he is liable for a large amount of damages.
The pre-Code law' has only recently begun to develop in the
area of damages.3 While the 1934 Act' has been the law for 46
years, only in the last decade have courts given us some guid-
ance on measures of damages." Ironically, that guidance has not
been helpful: recent litigation has produced a multitude of possi-
ble, and confusing, measures. In the present law we have-count
them-more than 30 measures of damages which have been
identified in rule 10b-5 cases alone.'
The measure of damages under the Code' is equally confus-
* LL.B., 1964, Cornell Law School; M.B.A., 1963, Cornell University; M.B.E., 1961,
Cornell University; Partner, Shea & Gould; Adjunct Associate Professor of Law, New
York Law School.
1. Securities Act of 1933, §§ 1-26, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (1976); Securities Exchange
Act of 1934, §§ 1-35, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78kk (1976 & Supp. III 1979).
2. See, e.g., J. I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964), in which the Court, in
implying a private cause of action for damages, stated that, "[tihe possibility of civil
damages, or injunctive relief serves as a most effective weapon in the enforcement of the
proxy requirements." Id. at 432.
3. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, §§ 1-35, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78kk (1976 & Supp. III
1979).
4. See, e.g., Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 155 (1972), where
the Court found the correct measure of damages in a rule 10b-5 action to be the differ-
ence between the fair market value of all that the seller received and the fair value of
what he would have received had there been no fraud. See also cases collected in 5B A.
JACOBS, THE IMPACT OF RuLE 10B-5, § 260.03[c][ii] n. 6 (1980).
5. 5B A. JAcOBs, supra note 4, § 260.03[c).
6. ALI FED. SEC. CODE (1978) (Proposed Official Draft). References in this speech
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ing. The Code is not easy to follow. Listen to section 1708(b):
"The measure of damages under section 1703(b) is computed as
in section 1708(a), except that (1) sections 1703(h)(1)(B),
1708(a)(1)(A), and 1708(a)(2)(A) do not apply. . . ." Or pick
one of the shortest of the sections, section 1708(d): "The mea-
sure of damages under sections 1705 and 1707 is computed as in
section 1708(c), read without references to offering statements or
amendments and as if section 1708(c)(2) referred to section 1705
rather than section 1704."s The Code goes on and on.
I am sure that all of you would like me to trace carefully
through each of the 30 measures of damages under the present
law and compare them to provisions like those I've just read in
the Code. Instead, I thought it might be better to take a specific
case, an hypothetical case, in which many different measures of
damages permissible under the present law are discussed and
then to compare these measures to the Code approach. This ex-
ample will show what I think is generally true: the measures of
damages in the law today are more favorable to plaintiffs than
the measures of damages the Code prescribes.
II. A Case Study
This is an hypothetical case involving a merger of two com-
panies. The merger had taken place, and the price of the stock
issued was $72 a share. This is designated as point A on the
graph. A proxy statement had been disseminated in connection
with the merger. The plaintiffs contended that the proxy state-
ment should have disclosed that the chief executive officer of the
are to the 1978 proposed draft. Comparison will be made with the ALI FED. SEC. CODE
(1980) (Official Draft) where the changes in the 1980 draft are significant. On Sept. 30,
1980, the Securities and Exchange Commission published, in an agency release, changes
to the 1980 draft which were agreed upon by Professor Loss and the Commission. SEC
Sec. Act Release No. 33-6242, 20 SEC Docket 1483 (1980) [hereinafter referred to and
cited as CODE RECOMMENDATION].
7. ALI FED. SEC. CODE § 1708(b) (1978). Section 1708 has undergone substantial
changes in the CODE RECOMMENDATION. CODE RECOMMENDATION, supra note 6, at 1499.
See Casper, Foreword, 1 Pace L. Rev. 279, 286-87 (1981).
8. ALI FED. SEC. CODE § 1708(d) (1978). Section 1708(d) of the 1980 draft provides:
(d) FOR SECTIONS 1705 AND 1707.-The measure of damages under sections
1705 and 1707 is computed as in sections 1708(a) (except as provided in section
1708(b)(1) and (2)) and section 1708(c)(2) (read as if that section referred to sec-





acquiring company had obtained a fair amount of business by
bribing city officials in two jurisdictions. The price of the stock
of the acquiring company that was issued remained relatively
constant at about $72 a share through the period referred to on
the graph as the Class 1 plateau. The bribes were then disclosed,
and the price of the stock dipped to $60. That is the valley re-
ferred to on the graph as Class 2. After about eight weeks, the
price of the stock reached $72 again and continued to climb fur-
ther to $170. That is the mountain that the graph refers to as
Class 3. Finally, after a two and one-half year period, the price
declined below $72, Class 4 on the graph.
In short, there existed the plateau of Class 1, where people
who bought the stock at the time of the merger sold it at the
same price before disclosure of the adverse information; the val-
ley of Class 2, where people sold after the disclosure of the bribe
at less than $72; the mountain of Class 3, where people sold the
stock at a price well above the $72 price paid at the time of
merger; and the final decline of Class 4, where people either sold
below $72 or still own the stock. I will use this hypothesized fact
pattern to discuss liabilities under the present law and to com-




III. Liability under Rule 10b-5, Section 11 and
The Proposed Code
A. Liability under Rule 10b-5
In our hypothetical litigation, the defendants, relying on
present law, argued that while there conceivably could be liabil-
ity with respect to Class 2 plaintiffs, there was no liability for
plaintiffs in Classes 1, 3 or 4. With respect to Class 1, defendants
argued that those who bought the stock of the acquired corpora-
tion in merger at $72 and who sold at the same price in Class 1
had no claim for damages. The defendant based his argument on
two principles. First, these plaintiffs incurred no loss: they
bought at $72, and they sold at $72. Second, there was no causal
nexus between any loss they might have sustained and the mis-
representation because the market had not yet adjusted for the
misrepresentation.
The defendants lost both arguments. The court, let us imag-
ine, held that it is possible for a Class 1 plaintiff to suffer dam-
age in this situation where he buys and sells at the same price.
The rationale of the court could have been that under present
law there may be liability in either of two ways. First, there is
the out-of-pocket measure under rule 10b-5. e The out-of-pocket
measure awards defrauded purchasers the difference between
what they paid for the security and its fair value on the date of
the fraud. Here, the plaintiffs paid $72, but the market price
would have been lower if the public had known that a percent-
age of the issuers' business was obtained by bribery. Second, the
court could have relied on Chasins v. Smith Barney & Co.10 to
9. For a discussion of the out-of-pocket measure, see 5B A. JACOBS, supra note 4, §
260.03[c][ii] (1980).
The out-of-pocket measure of damages can . . . be put this way:
For a defrauded seller: The fair value of the security he sold minus the fair value
of the consideration he received, all measured at the time of the transaction.
For a defrauded buyer: The fair value of the consideration he paid for the security
minus the fair value of the security he bought, all measured at the time of the
transaction.
10. Chasins v. Smith, Barney & Co., 306 F. Supp. 177 (S.D.N.Y. 1969), aff'd, 438
F.2d 1167 (2d Cir. 1970). Only defrauded buyers can use the Chasins or resale measure
of damages. This measure is so named because of the important role played by the price
at which a plaintiff sells or could sell the security he was fraudulently induced to buy. 5B




find a second possible measure of damages available to the
plaintiff - the price he paid for the security, $72, minus' the
lowest price the stock reached within a reasonable time after
disclosure of the bribery, $60. Under that formula, damages
would be $12.
With respect to Class 3 there was also a motion for sum-
mary judgment on damages; the defendants urged that no dam-
ages could be found because the plaintiffs suffered no loss. For
example, a Class 3 plaintiff who paid $72 for the stock in the
merger and who then sold at $102, suffered no damages at all.
He actually profited $30 on his transactions. Nevertheless, sum-
mary judgment for the defendants was denied. The court could
have based its opinion on the fact that persons who sold in Class
3 should have bought at $60 rather than $72. Those shareholders
would then have made an additional profit of $12.
As to Class 4, the defendants argued that they had no liabil-
ity for damages for two reasons. First, there could not possibly
be any causal relationship between the disclosure of the bribery
and the downturn in the market three years later.11 Second, the
plaintiffs had a duty to mitigate damages during the two and
one-half years that the price exceeded the $72 issuance price.12
Again, the court denied the motion for summary judgment, not-
withstanding case law which conceivably imposes a duty to
mitigate. 8
These were the holdings, reached by our hypothetical court,
under rule 10b-5 of the present law. The court did not reach the
question of liability under another provision, section 11 of the
1933 Act, which provides a civil remedy for false or misleading
11. For an identification of three standards of causation used in determining
whether remoteness limits recovery under rule 10b-5, see 5B A. JAcoBs, supra note 4, §
260.03[f][ii] and cases cited therein. The most liberal standard requires only that the
fraudulent act be in the chain of causation, while another requires causation -in-fact; the
most stringent standard requires direct injury, proximate cause or foreseeability. Id.
12. See generally 5B A. JACOBS, supra note 4, § 260.03[fJ[iv].
13. See Hecht v. Harris, Upham & Co., 283 F. Supp. 417 (N.D. Cal. 1968), aff'd on
other grounds, 430 F.2d 1202 (9th Cir. 1970). The Hecht court stated, "The purpose of
[the securities laws] is to protect the innocent investor, as distinguished from one who
loses his innocence and waits to see how his investment turns out. ... Id. at 428. But
see Harris v. American Inv. Co., 523 F.2d 220 (8th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1054
(1976). The Harris court held that a plaintiff is not obligated to sell stock after discovery
of fraud for the purpose of reducing damages. Id. at 227.
1981]
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statements contained in a registration statement.14 Because a
merger is now considered a sale by the Securities and Exchange
Commission,1 5 issuers must file a registration statement with the
Commission with respect to the securities to be issued in the
merger. A defendant's exposure is thereby increased because he
is now subject to both section 11 liability and rule 10b-5 liabil-
ity. In short, there are two overlapping remedies and the defen-
dant will be responsible for the greater amount.16
The remedy under rule 10b-5 is implied.17 It is, therefore,
not surprising to learn that no measure of damages is set forth
14. Securities Act of 1933, § 11, 15 U.S.C. § 77k (1976).
15. This change has been described by two commentators in the following manner:
The traditional combination of two independent businesses was until 1973 exempt
from the registration requirements of the 1933 Act by SA Rule 133, which pro-
ceeded on the theory that the mechanics of a shareholder vote, of corporate trans-
fers of assets, and of receipt of securities involve "no sale" of a security. The the-
ory ignored the reality of change, often radical change, in the investment position
of the security holder who received another security. And it ignored the possibility
for fraud in mergers. Rule 133 eventually sank of its own weight and was super-
seded by SA Rule 145, 17 C.F.R. § 230.145, requiring 1933 Act registration of se-
curities issued in mergers unless some other exemption is applicable.
2 A. BROMBERG & L. LOWENFELS, SECURITMES FRAUD & COMMODITIEs FRAUD, § 6.5 (114)
(1979) (citations omitted).
16. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 28(a), 15 U.S.C. 78bb(a) (1976). Section 28(a)
of the 1934 Act provides:
The rights and remedies provided by this chapter [the 1934 Act] shall be in
addition to any and all other rights and remedies that may exist at law or in
equity; but no person permitted to maintain a suit for damages under the provi-
sions of this chapter shall recover, through satisfaction of judgment in one or more
actions, a total amount in excess of his actual damages on account of the act com-
plained of.
Section 28 (a) . . . precludes recovery under 10b-5 if the plaintiff already ob-
tained damages under a Securities Act express or implied remedy. Thus, a com-
plainant can recover under 10b-5 the amount, if any, by which his actual damages
exceed the compensation he received under his 1933 Act claim. The situation is
less clear if a plaintiff seeks damages under both Acts in one suit, or if he recovers
actual damages under 10b-5 and in a later suit seeks damages under a 1933 Act
provision. In either case, he should be able to recover the full measure of damages
specified in a 1933 Act express remedy minus his 10b-5 recovery [footnote
omitted].
5B A. JACOBS, supra note 4, § 260.03[h]. Also see, e.g., Beecher v. Able, 435 F. Supp. 397
(S.D.N.Y. 1975). The court held that there was no possibility of a double recovery which
would prevent prosecution of a § 10(b) claim when no judgment had been entered on the
successful § 11 claim. Id. at 412-13.
17. See, e.g., Superintendent of Ins. of N.Y. v. Bankers Life and Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6
(1971). In Bankers Life, the Court stated that, "It is now established that a private right
of action is implied under § 10(b)." Id. at 13 n. 9 (citations omitted).
6http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol1/iss2/8
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in the rule. Unlike rule 10b-5, section 11(e) of the 1933 Act pro-
vides an express remedy.18 That measure is almost as compli-
cated as some of the measures of damages in the Code. In the
case we have been discussing, which is mapped on the graph,
there was no section 11 claim because at the time of the merger
the Commission did not require a registration statement. But, to
continue our hypothetical, let us assume they did, and examine
the liability that the defendant issuer would have had under sec-
tion 11.
B. Liability under Section 11
Section 11(e) provides three alternative measures of dam-
ages.19 The first measure is the price paid for the security, $72,
minus the value of the security at the time suit was brought. If
suit were brought at the lowest level, $60, then under this
formula plaintiffs would have had damages of $72 minus $60, or
$12.
The second measure is the price paid, $72, minus the price
at which such securities were disposed of in the market before
suit. That means that all the people in Class 1 would be entitled
to no damages since they disposed of their securities before suit
at $72. That is, their measure of damages would be the price
paid, $72, minus the price at which they sold before suit, $72 -
nothing.
The third measure, available if the damages are less than
those calculated under the first alternative, is the price paid for
the stock, $72, minus the price at which such securities were dis-
posed of after suit but before judgment. If we use this third
method, the damages are less than $12. This means that any-
body who sold in Class 3 would have no damages under this
meausre, and anyone who sold in Class 4 could have as much as
$12 worth of damages.
C. Liability Under Rule 10b-5 Compared with Section 11
Now let us compare liabilities under rule 10b-5. Based on
the court's opinion in the case we have been hypothesizing,





under rule 10b-5, defendants have a $12 liability for Class 1, a
$12 liability for Class 3, and a $12 liability for Class 4. Under
section 11, if it were applicable to the particular facts of this
case, the issuer would have no liability for Class 1, no liability
for Class 3, and as much as $12 liability for Class 4. But, because
of the overlap of remedies, the issuer would be liable for $12 per
share to Class 1, Class 3, and Class 4.
D. Liability Under the Code
The Code simplifies all this in the sense that it does not
permit overlapping remedies.2 0 I will spare you the details, but
by tracing through sections 170321 and 170522 of the Code, you
eventually conclude that this situation would be governed by
section 1704.23 Section 1704 imposes liability for false offering
statements and would, therefore, apply to this case. Section
1704(h) says the measure of damages is as stated in section
1708(c). Section 1708(c) says the measure of damages under sec-
tion 1704 (which is the provision we are talking about) is com-
puted as in section 1708(a), except as provided in sections
1708(b)(1) and (2) and 38 other exceptions.2 '
When you cut through it all, the Code really says that the
issuer (as distinguished from other persons who could be liable)
would be liable for the amount the plaintiff paid plus interest
($72 plus interest) minus the value of the security received, val-
ued as of the end of a reasonable period after the true facts be-
came known. We are positing that the security went down to $60
after a reasonable time. So the issuer's liability under the Code
is $72 minus $60, less any returns, 5 plus interest. There is no
20. ALI FED. SEC. CODE § 1722(0 (1978). This section provides:
(f) [Remedies noncumulative.] No person or class may recover, through satis-
faction of judgment in one or more actions, more than the greater of the amount
recoverable (1) in whatever action created by or based on a violation of this Code
(as defined in section 225) yields the greatest such amount, or (2) in any other
action.
21. Id. § 1703.
22. Id. § 1705.
23. Id. § 1704.
24. Id. § 1708. For a discussion of changes in this section made by the CODE RECOM-
MENDATION, see Casper, supra note 7, at 286-87.





concept in the Code of dividing the plaintiffs up among classes.
This measure of recovery applies to everybody. No matter when
a stockholder of the disappearing merger partner sold stock that
he got in the merger, he would be entitled, in this example, to
$12.
The Code sets up certain limits with respect to liability.
Many of these are derived from section 11(e) of the 1933 Act,
because section 1708(c) and section 1704 are basically the ana-
logues of section 11 of the 1933 Act. These limits do not apply to
the fact pattern we have been discussing. For instance, there are
limits on the liability of any particular defendant relating to the
amount of securities that he sold.2 6 This is designed for statu-
tory underwriters. Another limit, found in section 1708, which
again derives from section 11(e), is that the price from which
you subtract to get your damages, the minuend, cannot exceed
the offering price."' This has great significance in a fluctuating
market where plaintiffs are buying and selling in that market
subsequent to the merger. It is of no importance, however, in a
merger with respect to the people who purchased in the merger.
A final limit in section 1708 is that an underwriter is not liable
for any greater portion of the offering than his portion.2 8 This
has great practical importance in public offerings, but none in a
merger. -
Finally, I will touch on some other novel aspects of the
Code's provisions which limit damages. Under section 11 of the
1933 Act, there are no limits like those I am about to describe.
The Code, in section 1708(c)(2), incorporates some limit on the
measure of damages for false offering circulars.2 9 Recall that "of-
fering circulars" is the Code's name for registration statements.
For each defendant, the Code restricts the measure of damages
under the false offering circulars section to the greatest of the
following three items: One hundred thousand dollars, 1% of the
gross revenues of the defendant (up to $1,000,000), or the defen-
dant's profit. These limits do not apply if the plaintiff proves
that the misrepresentation was made with knowledge by the
26. ALI FED. SEC. CODE § 1708 (1978).
27. Id.
28. Id.




particular defendant, whatever knowledge means, nor do they
apply with respect to the registrant to the extent that an offer-
ing statement covers the distribution by or for the account or
benefit of the issuer, which is, of course, our case in the merger.
These limits, $100,000, 1% up to $1,000,000, and the profit ceil-
ing, under the Code's parallel to section 11, are innovations in
the law, but do not apply in a merger.
IV. Summary
What we've learned from all of this very technical detail is
that the Code contains a precise and specific measure of dam-
ages for each type of violation. The result is that damages are
limited in the Code in two ways. First, the multiple measures of
damages which formerly permitted overlapping remedies and
which gave a plaintiff the maximum possible recovery would no
longer be available. Second, the inclusion of precise definitions
of the damage remedies in the Code eliminates judicial flex-
ibility. Courts would be unable to award what they believe to be
just damages unless that amount can be calculated from the
measures found in the Code.
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